Posas v. Horton, 126 Nev. 112, 228 P.3d 457 (Nev. 2010)

Facts

  • Emilia Posas drove in slow, stop-and-go traffic.
  • A pedestrian pushing a stroller entered the roadway mid-block in front of Posas’s vehicle.
  • Posas braked suddenly to avoid striking the pedestrian.
  • Nicole Horton, traveling about 10–15 mph, followed Posas at roughly three to four feet and did not see the pedestrian.
  • Horton rear-ended Posas’s vehicle.
  • Driving conditions were normal and clear; the only unexpected event was the pedestrian’s entry into traffic.
  • Horton testified she was following too closely and that rear-ending Posas was her mistake.

Issues

  1. Whether a sudden-emergency jury instruction is proper in a rear-end collision where the defendant followed too closely in stop-and-go traffic and collided after the lead driver braked for a pedestrian.
  2. Whether giving the sudden-emergency instruction, if error, was prejudicial warranting a new trial.

Decision

  • The Nevada Supreme Court (en banc) reversed the defense verdict and remanded for a new trial.
  • The district court abused its discretion by giving a sudden-emergency instruction on these facts.
  • The error was prejudicial because the instruction supported the core defense theory and could have led the jury to excuse negligent conduct.
  • A sudden-emergency instruction is appropriate only when unexpected conditions confront the party requesting the instruction and that party was otherwise exercising reasonable care.
  • The doctrine does not apply if the requesting party’s negligence created or contributed to the peril.
  • In stop-and-go traffic, sudden stops are foreseeable; a following driver must maintain a sufficient distance to respond safely, and cannot reframe a foreseeable stop as a sudden emergency.

Conclusion

The court held that the sudden-emergency doctrine did not apply because any emergency confronted the lead driver avoiding the pedestrian, while the rear driver’s inadequate following distance showed a lack of due care; instructing the jury on sudden emergency improperly suggested an excuse for negligence and required a new trial.