## Facts

- Barnett was driving an automobile when a person was killed as a result of Barnett’s operation of the vehicle.
- The State charged Barnett with involuntary manslaughter, alleging the death was caused by criminally negligent driving.
- At trial, the judge instructed the jury that Barnett could be found guilty if, while engaged in the lawful act of driving, he operated the vehicle negligently and the negligent operation caused the death.
- In explaining negligence, the court provided a definition framed in terms of ordinary negligence (failure to use due care) and did not expressly require the jury to find “gross negligence” or “recklessness.”
- The jury convicted Barnett of involuntary manslaughter.
- Barnett appealed, arguing the jury instructions were erroneous, including (1) reasonable doubt language, (2) omission of an express presumption-of-innocence instruction, and (3) use of ordinary-negligence language rather than a higher level of fault.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court’s reasonable-doubt instruction failed to tell the jury that any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
2. Whether the trial court’s failure to give an explicit presumption-of-innocence instruction required reversal when the jury was instructed on reasonable doubt and defense counsel did not request an additional charge.
3. Whether, in an involuntary manslaughter prosecution arising from an automobile death, the jury must be instructed that the State must prove gross negligence or recklessness (not merely ordinary negligence).

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction.
- The reasonable-doubt exception failed because the charge, as given, told jurors that if they had a reasonable doubt, they must resolve it in the defendant’s favor and return a not-guilty verdict.
- The absence of an express presumption-of-innocence instruction was not reversible error where the jury was fully charged on reasonable doubt and the defense did not request an added instruction after the court invited requests for further charges.
- Reading the negligence instructions as a whole, the court found no reversible error in the trial judge’s use of ordinary-negligence language in this automobile involuntary manslaughter case and declined to overturn the conviction on the ground that the jury had to be instructed using “gross negligence” or “recklessness” terminology.

## Legal Principles

- A reasonable-doubt instruction is adequate when it places the burden on the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and directs the jury to acquit if it has such a doubt.
- Omission of a presumption-of-innocence charge is not automatically reversible error when the court otherwise fully instructs on reasonable doubt and the defendant does not request a specific presumption-of-innocence instruction when given an opportunity to do so.
- In South Carolina involuntary manslaughter cases arising from motor-vehicle deaths, the sufficiency of negligence instructions is evaluated from the charge as a whole; use of ordinary-negligence language, in context, may be upheld where the instructions require a blameworthy failure of due care that causes death.

## Conclusion

State v. Barnett affirmed an involuntary manslaughter conviction stemming from an automobile death, holding that the trial court adequately instructed on reasonable doubt, that the failure to include an explicit presumption-of-innocence charge was not reversible error absent a defense request where reasonable doubt was fully explained, and that the negligence instructions, viewed in their entirety, did not require reversal merely because they used ordinary-negligence terminology rather than expressly demanding “gross negligence” or “recklessness.”


State v. Barnett, 63 S.E.2d 57 (1951)