## Facts

- Brian Lamont Sowell worked for Recycling Incorporated, a private company that paid employees in cash.
- On October 17, 1995, Sowell called office manager DeLisa Holmes to ask when payroll would be ready; she said noon. He asked how employees would be paid; she said in cash, and he responded “good.”
- Sowell came to the office around 12:30 p.m. and collected his wages in cash.
- About an hour later, three armed men in dark clothing entered the office, held Holmes at gunpoint, and demanded cash; Holmes placed approximately $14,600 into a bag supplied by one robber.
- Holmes testified the gunman appeared familiar with the office and knew where the money was kept.
- Co-defendant Anthony Williams testified that Sowell suggested “easy money,” selected the employer because it paid in cash, provided a map, and gave instructions about where employees would be and who might have a gun.
- Sowell was not physically present at the office during the robbery; he was on his route at the time.
- Evidence indicated the participants, including Sowell, later met to divide the proceeds.
- The State charged and tried Sowell on a principal-liability theory, and a jury convicted him of armed robbery, robbery, two handgun-use counts, and first-degree assault.
- The intermediate appellate court reversed for insufficient evidence of actual or constructive presence, and the State sought further review.

## Issues

1. Whether Maryland continued to recognize the common-law distinction between principals and accessories absent a statute abolishing it.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Sowell as a principal in the second degree where he planned the robbery but was not shown to be actually or constructively present at the scene.
3. Whether, given the charging decision to proceed as a principal rather than as an accessory before the fact, Sowell’s convictions could stand without proof of actual or constructive presence.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the common-law distinction between principals and accessories remained in force in Maryland absent legislative abolition.
- The court held the evidence was insufficient to prove Sowell was a principal in the second degree because it did not establish actual or constructive presence during the robbery.
- The court affirmed the judgment reversing Sowell’s convictions.

## Legal Principles

- Maryland retains common-law categories of participation in crime (principal in the first degree, principal in the second degree, accessory before the fact) unless altered by the General Assembly.
- A principal in the second degree must be present at the crime, either actually or constructively, while aiding or encouraging its commission.
- Constructive presence requires that the defendant be situated so as to be able, and intend, to render immediate aid during the offense; prior planning alone is insufficient.
- When the State proceeds on a principal theory, it must prove the elements of principal liability; a defendant who is, at most, an accessory before the fact cannot be convicted as a principal without proof of presence as required by common law.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed reversal of Sowell’s convictions, holding that Maryland still applies the common-law principal/accessory distinction and that detailed planning and later receipt of proceeds did not establish the actual or constructive presence necessary for principal-in-the-second-degree liability.


State v. Sowell, 353 Md. 713, 728 A.2d 712 (Md. 1999)