Introduction
The concept of actus reus forms a fundamental component of criminal law, particularly in offenses as grave as murder. Actus reus, literally translated as "guilty act," refers to the physical element of a crime; it is the conduct that the law prohibits. For the crime of murder, the actus reus consists of the unlawful killing of a human being under the Queen’s peace. Technical principles such as causation must link the defendant’s actions to the victim’s death, meaning the defendant’s conduct must be both a factual and a legal cause of the prohibited outcome. Key requirements include establishing that the victim was a human being, the killing was unlawful and under the Queen’s peace, and there must be no break in the chain of causation. The actus reus must also be a voluntary act of the defendant, unless a recognized exception exists, such as situations involving omissions. This careful delineation ensures that criminal liability is attributed only when both the physical and mental elements of a crime are present.
The Core Elements of Actus Reus in Murder
The actus reus for murder is composed of several essential elements, each of which must be proven to secure a conviction. First, the act of "killing" must be demonstrated. This means establishing that the defendant's conduct resulted in the cessation of the victim’s life. It is not necessary to prove that the defendant directly killed the victim with their own hands, as liability can also arise from actions that indirectly lead to death. Second, the killing must be "unlawful." A killing is not considered unlawful if it is committed in self-defense or under other circumstances that the law deems justified. Thirdly, the victim must be a "human being". The law recognizes that a human is a ‘reasonable creature in rerum natura’ under the Queen’s peace. Fourthly, the killing must occur under the "Queen’s peace." This term has historical significance and essentially means that the killing of an enemy combatant in a recognized state of war does not constitute murder. These core elements form the basis for establishing the physical aspect of the crime, distinct from the mental element (mens rea). The prosecution carries the responsibility to prove each element beyond reasonable doubt.
Causation: Linking Conduct and Consequence
Causation plays a critical role in the actus reus of murder, establishing the link between a defendant’s actions and the victim’s death. Legal causation requires establishing a connection between the defendant’s actions and the prohibited consequence of death. Causation is typically broken down into two parts: factual and legal causation. Factual causation is usually proven using the ‘but for’ test, meaning ‘but for’ the actions of the defendant, the victim would not have died. An example of this is seen in the case of R v White [1910], where the defendant put poison in his mother’s drink, with the intent to kill her. The medical evidence suggested that the cause of death was not due to poisoning but heart failure. Therefore, even though his intentions were murderous, he did not cause her death.
Legal causation requires that the defendant’s actions are a substantial and operating cause of the death. The actions must be more than minimal or de minimis. For example, in R v Smith [1959], the defendant stabbed the victim in a fight; the victim was dropped twice on the way to the medical station where he later died. The court found that the defendant was still liable for the death despite the intervening events of the victim being dropped on his journey to medical assistance. This is because the court deemed that the stabbing was still a significant cause of death. It was a substantial and operating cause. Legal causation also requires that there must be no novus actus interveniens, meaning a new intervening act. This can include a free, deliberate, and informed act of a third party which breaks the chain of causation. As defined in R v Pagett, reasonable acts of self-defence do not break the chain of causation. In cases such as R v Blaue, the "egg-shell skull" rule also applies, meaning that the defendant must take the victim as they find them, including any pre-existing vulnerabilities. Therefore, the chain of causation will not be broken if the victim's death is exacerbated by a pre-existing condition. This legal component ensures that responsibility is assigned to those whose actions directly and significantly contributed to the victim's death. The case of R v Thabo Meli clarifies that where the defendant's acts are all part of one pre-conceived plan, the act inflicting the final blow need not coincide in time with the mens rea.
The Problem of Omissions: When Failure to Act Constitutes Actus Reus
Generally, criminal liability requires a positive act, but in certain limited circumstances, a failure to act, or an omission, can also constitute the actus reus for murder. For an omission to suffice, a legal duty to act must exist and be breached. These duties can arise from various sources. One such duty arises from a contractual obligation, as seen in R v Pittwood [1902], where a gatekeeper's failure to close a railway crossing led to a fatal accident. Another legal duty arises from a relationship of dependence, as in R v Gibbins and Proctor [1918], where a parent and partner were found liable for the death of a child due to neglect. The Court held that as the partner had accepted money for food for both herself and the child, a moral and legal obligation to care for the child was formed and that she had neglected to perform this duty. A duty can also arise when a person has voluntarily assumed responsibility for another’s care, as in R v Stone and Dobinson [1977]. Here, the defendants were convicted of manslaughter for failing to assist a family member who had become seriously ill whilst staying with them. Furthermore, a duty to act can also arise when a person creates a dangerous situation, as in R v Miller [1983], which states that once you create a dangerous situation, you have a responsibility to resolve that danger. In all these instances, the law imposes a duty to act to prevent harm, and failure to do so can satisfy the actus reus requirement for serious crimes such as murder or manslaughter.
Voluntary Conduct and its Exceptions
The actus reus must be a voluntary act of the defendant; the defendant must be responsible for his actions. If an act is involuntary, the defendant will not be criminally liable. Automatism is an instance of involuntary conduct. This occurs when the defendant acts without conscious control. For example in R v Quick [1973], the defendant, a diabetic, was charged with assaulting his victim. The assault occurred whilst the defendant was in a state of hypoglycaemia. The Court held that the defendant should have been acquitted on the ground of automatism. His unconscious state had been the result of external factors. In situations where an individual is forced by external forces to act in a particular way, they will not be criminally liable as it would be an involuntary act. In Leicester v Pearson (1952), a car driver was prosecuted for failing to give precedence to a pedestrian on a zebra crossing, but was acquitted when it was established that his car had been pushed onto the crossing by another car hitting it from behind. There are also specific instances in which the actus reus is constituted by a ‘state of affairs’. In these instances, there may not be any voluntary action. In R v Larsonneur (1933), a French national was charged with “being found” in the UK, even though she had been forcibly returned to the UK. Furthermore, in Winzar (1983), the defendant was convicted with being found drunk in a public highway despite not entering the road voluntarily. These cases highlight that the law may hold individuals liable based on an involuntary state of being, which goes against traditional principles of mens rea and actus reus. However, it is recognised that such instances are rare, and it is only in exceptional circumstances when the defendant will be liable for an act which is not voluntary.
Specific Intent, Basic Intent, and the Actus Reus
The concept of intent is typically explored in the context of mens rea. However, the distinction between specific intent and basic intent has implications for establishing the actus reus in certain cases, particularly in regards to voluntary intoxication. The term specific intent has been defined in R v Heard [2007] as an intention that extends beyond the actus reus itself, and is sometimes referred to as ulterior intent. Basic intent, on the other hand, is an intention that only extends to the actus reus itself. In cases involving voluntary intoxication, if a crime requires specific intent and the defendant is intoxicated, it may negate their ability to form the necessary intent. Therefore, such a defendant may be acquitted of a crime which requires specific intent. If the crime only requires basic intent, then the voluntary intoxication will not be considered a defence, as the defendant was deemed reckless to have intoxicated themselves voluntarily. This does not mean that the defendant did not perform the actus reus it simply means that the corresponding mens rea is not proven. Hence, though the act was still performed, it may not meet the threshold for certain specific offences.
Conclusion
The actus reus for murder comprises a complex set of legal requirements. It demands a clear establishment of the unlawful killing of a human being, under the Queen’s peace, along with a proven causal link between the actions of the defendant and the death of the victim. The concept also extends to omissions in certain situations where a duty to act exists and is breached. Furthermore, the concept of voluntariness in the actus reus is critical, along with the recognition that certain exceptions can apply to liability. Understanding the nuances of actus reus as it relates to murder provides a framework for identifying when an act is deemed criminal and when it is not. The principles are not just legal abstractions; they are the basis of establishing culpability in cases involving the most serious violation of the right to life. In cases where a plan is made between an accessory and a principal, such as in R v Gilmour, the accessory is not liable beyond what they foresaw the principal to have intended. However, if the actions of a principal are within the scope of the plan, the accessory will be liable for the actus reus of the crime, as demonstrated in the hypothetical scenario regarding Omar, from the reference material.
