## Facts

- The defendant deliberately placed alcohol in another person's drink, knowing the person would later drive.
- The unsuspecting individual was subsequently convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol.
- The primary issue was whether the defendant could be held liable for procuring the commission of the drunk driving offence.
- The case was considered by the House of Lords to clarify the requirements of procurement in criminal liability.

## Issues

1. Whether procurement in criminal law necessitates a deliberate act with the intent to cause the commission of an offence.
2. Whether merely enabling or creating the opportunity for a crime amounts to procurement, or if a direct causal link is required.
3. How procurement is to be distinguished from other forms of secondary liability, such as aiding, abetting, or advising.

## Decision

- The House of Lords held that procurement requires a deliberate act intended to cause another person to commit the offence.
- Merely creating an opportunity or enabling the commission of an offence does not suffice; specific intent is essential.
- The defendant’s conduct must directly contribute to the offence but need not be the sole cause.
- Procurement is distinct from aiding, abetting, or advising, as it requires both specific intent and direct causation.

## Legal Principles

- Procurement in criminal law involves the intentional causation of another’s offence.
- Liability for procurement requires both intent and a direct causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the offence.
- Merely assisting or enabling falls short of procurement; intent and direct causation are mandatory.
- Procurement is differentiated from aiding and abetting, which may not require intent to cause the principal offence.

## Conclusion

The House of Lords determined that liability for procurement requires both a direct intent to cause the main offence and a direct causal link between the defendant’s actions and the commission of that offence, distinguishing procurement from other forms of secondary liability.


Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773