Introduction
Automatism, within a legal context, describes a state where an individual performs actions without conscious control of their body. The principle underpinning this defence is that for an act to be considered criminal, it must be a product of a voluntary will, meaning a person must be in control of their actions. Automatism, therefore, negates the necessary element of voluntariness required for criminal liability. This absence of control is viewed as a fundamental departure from the ordinary functioning of an individual. To successfully use automatism as a defence, the defendant must demonstrate a complete loss of voluntary control, not merely impaired or reduced control. Furthermore, the cause of this lack of control is subject to strict scrutiny, separating automatism from related concepts such as insanity.
Defining Automatism and its Requirements
The defence of automatism requires more than a mere assertion of involuntary actions. It necessitates demonstrating a total destruction of voluntary control. The case of Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1992) [1994] QB 91, explicitly established that impaired, reduced, or partial control is insufficient for an automatism defence. In this case, a truck driver's claim of "driving without awareness" due to monotonous driving conditions was dismissed, as he retained partial control over the vehicle and would have been able to react to significant external stimuli. This case highlights the strict standard for total loss of control necessary for the defence to apply.
Additionally, the legal system distinguishes between “sane” and “insane” automatism, based on the underlying cause. Sane automatism arises from external factors, while insane automatism stems from internal conditions or a "disease of the mind." The distinction was articulated in R v Quick [1973] QB 910, where a diabetic's hypoglycaemic state (caused by the external factor of insulin injection and insufficient food) led to a charge being dropped and the court concluding that a malfunctioning of the mind of transitory effect caused by the application of external factors can not be fairly described as a disease. On the other hand, in R v Hennessy [1989] 2 All ER 9, a diabetic’s hyperglycaemic state due to failing to take insulin, was deemed to be a result of an inherent defect, and hence a "disease of the mind" which led to a verdict of insanity. This differentiation is pivotal, as insane automatism, which involves a disease of the mind, leads to a special verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" which can result in detention in a mental health facility, while sane automatism leads to a complete acquittal.
External Factors and Sane Automatism
Sane automatism, unlike its insane counterpart, is caused by external factors and leads to a full acquittal. These external factors must be of a nature that they are not caused by an internal condition. A variety of external factors can give rise to a claim of sane automatism. These include, but are not limited to, external impacts such as a blow to the head, or the administration of drugs. In R v T [1990] Crim LR 256, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) resulting from a rape was considered an external factor that led to a dissociative state during a robbery. The court found that the trauma of the rape could constitute an external factor causing a temporary malfunctioning of the mind. Similarly, in R v Antoniuk (1995) The Times, 28 March, the shock of being raped was accepted as an external factor, although the defendant in that case had to prove total loss of control due to that external factor.
The case of Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277 provides an important limit to the extent to which an external factor can be said to have led to automatism. It determined that simply losing consciousness when driving is not sufficient to constitute automatism. The defendant must prove that there was a complete loss of control due to an external factor. Merely being drowsy, falling asleep, or not paying attention does not meet the necessary standard. The burden of proof is on the defendant to prove they acted in a state of automatism. The external factor must cause the defendant to act involuntarily.
Internal Factors and Insane Automatism
When the loss of voluntary control arises from internal factors, the defence of automatism becomes the defence of insanity, legally known as “insane automatism.” A key consideration is whether the condition could reoccur. Conditions like sleepwalking, as demonstrated in R v Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92, are considered internal as they originate within the individual, and may reoccur. The court stated that while sleep is a normal condition, violence during sleep is abnormal, and that the condition had manifested itself in violence which may recur, therefore it was a disease of the mind.
Epilepsy, as illustrated in R v Sullivan [1984] AC 156, is categorized as a disease of the mind, regardless of its temporary or intermittent nature, since it stems from an internal condition. The case stipulated that any disease that impairs mental faculties like reason, memory, and understanding can be seen as a disease of the mind and it does not matter if the impairment was permanent or temporary as long as it was present at the time of the crime. The emphasis is on safeguarding society from repeated dangerous conduct and the need for treatment, rather than on the duration of the impairment. The underlying condition causing a mental state will determine if it is classified as a disease of the mind. Similarly, in R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399, a condition called arteriosclerosis, which caused a restriction of blood to the brain was categorized as a disease of the mind. The ruling in Kemp is not that the defendant’s brain was diseased but that the mental faculties were impaired because of it.
The Role of Intoxication in Automatism
The effect of voluntary intoxication on the defence of automatism is complex. Self-induced intoxication, primarily from alcohol or dangerous drugs, generally does not constitute a valid defence. DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 established this principle, noting that individuals who become voluntarily intoxicated are considered reckless, as they should know the risks associated with intoxication. The recklessness arising from the voluntary intoxication is taken to be an adequate substitute for mens rea, in a crime of basic intent. However, R v Hardie [1985] 1 W.L.R. 64 made an important distinction; if an individual takes a sedative like valium, not knowing that it will make them act unpredictably, it is still possible for them to use automatism as a defence as their intoxication can not be considered reckless.
Furthermore, the case of R v Bailey [1983] 1 W.L.R. 760 clarified that self-induced automatism caused by non-dangerous drugs (like failure to take food after injecting insulin for diabetics), may provide a defence if the defendant did not realize there was a risk of it causing aggressive or uncontrolled behaviour. In that case, the court determined that self-induced automatism that is not caused by dangerous drugs or alcohol can be a defense to a crime of basic intent. The court clarified that there needs to be recklessness associated with consuming alcohol or a dangerous drug, which would result in aggressive or unpredictable behaviour. The defendant was held not to have been reckless, and hence the defense of automatism was not precluded.
Automatism vs. Other Defences
It is essential to distinguish automatism from other legal defences, such as insanity and diminished responsibility. Insanity, as defined by the M'Naghten Rules, applies when a defendant, due to a disease of the mind, did not know the nature and quality of their act or that it was wrong. Diminished responsibility, as defined under the Homicide Act 1957 (HA 1957) s. 2(1), (as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (CJOA 2009)), is a defence specific to murder charges where the defendant had an impairment due to a medical condition, which provided an explanation for the act that resulted in death.
Automatism negates the actus reus, meaning the act was not voluntary, and therefore the mental state is immaterial. Insanity focuses on a defect of reason and the defendant’s mental state during the commission of the offence. In the case of R v Clarke [1972] 1 All ER 219 the defendant, who had been absent minded due to depression, was held not to be insane, as her reasoning powers were not defective. The court determined that the M’Naghten Rules do not apply to people who retain the power of reasoning, but in moments of confusion or absent-mindedness, do not use their powers to the full. Similarly, diminished responsibility applies when there is recognition of actions, but there is a recognised impairment, while automatism requires a total absence of control, hence recognising that an act was done involuntarily.
Conclusion
Automatism as a defence provides a complex area of criminal law, highlighting the critical link between voluntariness and culpability. The defence requires a total loss of voluntary control due to an external factor, thus differentiating it from insanity and diminished responsibility. The distinctions between sane and insane automatism, and the impact of voluntary intoxication, demonstrate a high level of scrutiny applied to this defence by the legal system. Key cases like Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1992), R v Quick, R v Hennessy, and R v Sullivan define these concepts and provide a framework for understanding the boundaries of automatism as a defence. The interplay between these cases reinforces the principle that criminal culpability requires a voluntary act, but equally, safeguards society by ensuring individuals are not easily able to use automatism as a defense. The stringent requirements highlight a carefully considered balance between safeguarding individuals from unjust convictions and protecting the public from potentially harmful behavior.
