Facts
- Mr. Cooper constructed a house in the Wandsworth district without providing the Wandsworth Board of Works with the mandated seven days’ notice, as required by law.
- Section 76 of the Metropolis Local Management Act 1855 permitted the Board to demolish buildings erected without notice.
- Acting under this statutory power, the Board demolished Mr. Cooper’s house without giving him prior notice or an opportunity to present his case.
Issues
- Whether the Wandsworth Board of Works was required to provide Mr. Cooper with notice and an opportunity to be heard before exercising its statutory power to demolish his house.
- Whether the absence of an explicit statutory requirement for a hearing relieved the Board from the duty to act fairly.
Decision
- The Court of Common Pleas held that the Board acted unlawfully by demolishing the house without giving prior notice or a hearing.
- The Court found that, despite the statute's silence, principles of natural justice required the Board to afford Mr. Cooper the opportunity to explain or justify his actions.
- The power to demolish was subject to an implied condition of procedural fairness.
- The judgment established that administrative bodies are bound to act fairly even where statutes appear to grant broad or absolute powers.
Legal Principles
- The decision articulated the principle of audi alteram partem (“hear the other side”), establishing the right to a hearing before adverse administrative action.
- Procedural fairness may be implied into statutory powers when the exercise of those powers significantly affects individuals’ rights or interests.
- The duty to provide a hearing applies irrespective of the presence or absence of explicit statutory language.
- The judgment reinforced judicial oversight of administrative bodies to ensure accountability and protect individual rights.
Conclusion
Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works is a seminal authority in administrative law, confirming that procedural fairness and the right to be heard constrain the exercise of statutory powers by public bodies, even absent explicit statutory requirements. This case forms the basis for the modern doctrine of fair procedures in governmental decision-making.