Introduction
The offense of handling stolen goods constitutes a significant aspect of property crime, specifically addressing the reception and disposition of items acquired through theft. This criminal act, as defined by Section 22(1) of the Theft Act 1968, occurs when a person dishonestly receives stolen goods, or assists in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the benefit of another person or arranges to do so. The central technical principle involves a distinction between the initial act of theft and the subsequent act of handling, with the latter addressing the movement of the property after the theft has already occurred. Key requirements for establishing guilt include demonstrating that the goods were, in fact, stolen, that the defendant handled the goods, and that they did so with knowledge or belief that the goods were stolen and with dishonesty. The criminal law distinguishes this from the actual act of stealing.
Defining the Offense: Scope and Elements
The act of “handling stolen goods” is designed to discourage individuals from profiting from theft by dealing with stolen items. Section 22(1) of the Theft Act 1968 establishes that a person commits this offense if, “knowing or believing” that goods are stolen, they “dishonestly receive the goods, or dishonestly undertake or assist in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the benefit of another person, or if he arranges to do so.” A primary consideration, therefore, rests on the specific mens rea, or mental state, of the accused. This goes beyond mere possession, as the accused needs to understand the stolen nature of the goods. It does not matter where the original theft took place. The offense is complete even if the goods are handled outside the place where they were stolen from. A person could, for example, receive goods stolen in London whilst they are in Birmingham.
The definition also incorporates the concept of ‘dishonesty.’ The courts must be satisfied that the defendant acted dishonestly as well as having the necessary knowledge or belief. The ‘Ghosh’ test is applied which asks, firstly, whether the ordinary person would see the actions as dishonest and, secondly, whether the defendant knew that ordinary people would regard the actions as dishonest.
Mens Rea: Knowledge, Belief, and Dishonesty
The element of mens rea in the offense of handling stolen goods specifically requires either knowledge or belief that the goods were stolen. The legal distinction between "knowledge" and "belief" is important. Knowledge implies a certainty, often based on direct information, such as being told by the thief that the goods were stolen, as was highlighted in R v Hall [1985] 81 Cr App R 260. "Belief" is a lower threshold, requiring that the defendant realises that there is no other reasonable conclusion that could be drawn in the circumstances other than that the goods were stolen. This is a subjective test, focusing on the defendant’s actual awareness, not what a reasonable person would have thought.
A critical ruling in R v Moys [1984] 79 Cr App R 72 clarified that a mere suspicion, even coupled with deliberately ignoring the circumstances, does not constitute a belief. The court in Moys overturned the conviction because the judge had said that suspicion coupled with wilful blindness amounted to a belief. The test is subjective, not objective. The prosecution must prove that the accused knew or believed that the goods were stolen, not merely that he should have known. The courts made it clear that wilfully shutting one’s eyes to the obvious was not sufficient.
Appropriation and the Timing of the Offense
The offense of handling stolen goods occurs after the original theft has been completed. It is distinct from the act of stealing itself. The case of R v Pitham and Hehl (1997) 65 Cr App R 45 establishes that the act of appropriation, which forms part of the definition of theft, can occur at the point when an offer to sell the goods is made, even if the goods have not yet moved from their original location. This is significant when determining if the defendant’s handling is in the course of stealing or a separate handling offence. The court held that the handling occurred when they became involved after the appropriation had taken place. In this case, the appropriation occurred when the offer to sell was made. The Court of Appeal said the act of removing the goods from the property was not part of the theft.
Attempted Handling and Factual Impossibility
The legal complexities surrounding attempted crimes were prominently explored in Anderton v Ryan [1985] AC 560. In this case, the defendant handled a video cassette believing it to be stolen, but there was no evidence that the cassette was in fact stolen. The House of Lords ruled that a person could not be convicted of attempted handling of stolen goods if the underlying act would be innocent, that is, not criminal, even if their actions would have been criminal if the facts were as they believed. This ruling was later overruled by Shivpuri, but the principle provides an important understanding of the law at the time, and illustrates the distinction between subjective intention and objective conduct.
The main question at stake in the case was whether a person can be guilty of an attempt when their action, if completed, would be innocent. The court in Anderton v Ryan said that the actions of the defendant were ‘objectively innocent’ and therefore, no attempt to commit the crime was possible.
Duress as a Defense
The availability of duress as a defense to the offense of handling stolen goods is subject to specific limitations. The case of A-G v Whelan [1993] IEHC 1 provides relevant considerations regarding duress. The case law establishes that duress, when proven, may serve as a complete defense to some crimes, provided the threat of violence or death is imminent and sufficient to overpower the will of a reasonable person, but this defense is generally not allowed for a particularly serious crime such as murder. This Irish case is persuasive in other common law jurisdictions. The court stated that duress was a complete defence provided it had been proven that a reasonable person would have committed the crime and that the defendant’s will had been overpowered at the time of the crime. The court also stated that duress is not a defence to murder.
Conclusion
The handling of stolen goods is a criminal offense targeted to stop individuals from gaining from stolen property. It requires that the defendant knew or believed the goods to be stolen and did so dishonestly. Understanding the definition of the offense, as found in the Theft Act 1968, involves recognition of the different elements of the crime, notably appropriation, the required mental state, and the importance of distinguishing between suspicion and belief. As shown through relevant case law, like R v Pitham and Hehl, the handling offense occurs after the theft itself. Anderton v Ryan highlights the issues with attempted crimes and factual impossibility while A-G v Whelan provides considerations concerning the defense of duress. The law, therefore, looks at the mental state of the accused, while not ignoring the circumstances surrounding the crime. The Theft Act 1968, together with legal precedent, form a coherent, if complex, framework for dealing with offenses related to the handling of stolen goods.
