Introduction
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 introduces a major shift in how laws are applied in the United Kingdom. This part directs courts to interpret both primary and secondary laws in a manner consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), where feasible. This obligation alters traditional legal methods, requiring judges to prioritize the aims of legislation while ensuring UK law aligns with the ECHR. The objective is to identify interpretations that comply with Convention rights without distorting the law’s text or legislative intent. This section does not permit courts to invalidate primary laws that conflict with rights; such authority remains restricted to declarations under section 4.
The Scope of Section 3
The obligation under section 3 covers all legislation, including Acts of Parliament, secondary laws, and older statutes. This broad application highlights the Human Rights Act’s influence across the legal system. Courts must account for Convention rights whenever a law is relevant, regardless of the case’s primary subject. This applies even when human rights arguments are not explicitly made. For instance, in R v A (No 2) (2001), the House of Lords applied section 3 to interpret the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 in accordance with Article 6 ECHR’s fair trial guarantees, despite the law not directly addressing human rights.
The Limits of Interpretation: “So far as it is possible to do so”
While section 3 assumes laws can align with rights, it acknowledges that some conflicts cannot be resolved. The phrase “so far as it is possible” recognizes that a law’s wording may make compliance unworkable. This prevents courts from overstepping their role by rewriting legislation. Determining what is “possible” involves weighing the law’s plain meaning, history, and context. In Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza (2004), the House of Lords revised the interpretation of the Rent Act 1977 to avoid discrimination under Article 14 ECHR. However, this authority has limits, as seen in Bellinger v Bellinger (2003), where the court declined to reinterpret the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to recognize same-sex marriage, stating such changes were for Parliament alone.
Section 3 and Parliamentary Sovereignty
The relationship between section 3 and Parliament’s supremacy remains contentious. While section 3 allows courts to adjust legal interpretations, they cannot override primary legislation. This preserves Parliament’s ultimate authority. A section 4 declaration highlights a law’s incompatibility with Convention rights but leaves it enforceable. This framework enables Parliament to address conflicts while fostering dialogue between judges and lawmakers on human rights issues.
The Impact of Section 3 on Legal Practice
Section 3 has transformed legal work in the UK. Lawyers must now address Convention rights in all cases, from drafting documents to courtroom arguments. Understanding section 3’s requirements is essential for effective representation, as it provides a basis to challenge laws that may restrict rights. This obligation demands familiarity with the ECHR and related rulings, enabling lawyers to argue for interpretations that align UK law with human rights standards.
Section 3 and the Future of Human Rights Protection
Section 3 remains central to human rights protection in the UK. Its role is evident in debates about the UK’s relationship with the ECHR. Even if the UK’s human rights framework evolves, section 3’s interpretive approach will continue influencing rights law. Ongoing dialogue between judges, lawmakers, and officials on section 3’s application ensures its relevance in upholding rights within the UK’s legal system.
Conclusion
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 has significantly altered how UK courts interpret laws. The duty to align legislation with Convention rights represents a major advancement in rights protection. While respecting judicial boundaries and Parliament’s supremacy, section 3 enables courts to uphold human rights within legal constraints. Cases like Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza and Bellinger v Bellinger illustrate both the potential and limits of section 3. Continued debate over its use will maintain its importance in UK human rights law.
