Introduction
The intoxication defence in criminal law is a complex area concerning the extent to which a defendant's state of intoxication can excuse or mitigate criminal liability. It addresses situations where a defendant commits an offence while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. This defence is not a blanket exemption; instead, it operates within specific legal parameters. Crucially, the law distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary intoxication, and between crimes of "basic intent" and "specific intent." A central principle is that voluntary intoxication is generally not a defence, particularly for crimes of basic intent. However, it may be relevant in assessing the mens rea (the mental element of a crime) for specific intent offences. The technical rules are rooted in considerations of public policy and individual culpability. Specific requirements, such as the nature of the substance, the level of impairment, and the type of offence, all play a role in determining whether the intoxication defence can be successfully invoked.
The Specific Intent vs. Basic Intent Dichotomy
A foundational aspect of the intoxication defence is the differentiation between crimes of specific and basic intent. This distinction, originating from the case of DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443, determines when voluntary intoxication can be relevant. A crime of specific intent requires a higher level of mens rea, typically requiring an intent to bring about a particular consequence beyond the act itself. In R v Heard [2007] EWCA Crim 125, specific intent was defined as an ulterior intent that goes beyond the actus reus (the physical act) of the crime. Examples of specific intent crimes include murder and offences under s.18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (wounding with intent). On the other hand, basic intent crimes, such as assault and manslaughter, do not require this further intention and can be satisfied by recklessness. R v Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152 establishes that voluntary intoxication is not a defence to manslaughter. According to DPP v Majewski, self-induced intoxication is not a defence if recklessness is sufficient for the mens rea of a crime. In essence, voluntary intoxication can negate mens rea for specific intent crimes where intent is required but not for basic intent crimes where recklessness is sufficient.
Voluntary Intoxication: The General Rule
The general rule, as established in DPP v Majewski, is that voluntary intoxication, even if it causes a state of automatism, is not a defence to crimes of basic intent. This principle is based on the idea that a person who becomes intoxicated is reckless in doing so and should be held responsible for the consequences of their actions. This recklessness substitutes for the mens rea of the crime. A "drunken intent is still intent" as stated in DPP v Majewski. The rationale is that when an individual voluntarily consumes a substance that impairs their judgement, they should bear the responsibility for any harms they cause, unless the crime is one of specific intent. For basic intent crimes, the act of becoming voluntarily intoxicated is considered reckless, and this recklessness satisfies the mens rea requirements. As R v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 confirmed, self-induced intoxication is no defence to a crime where recklessness constitutes sufficient mens rea.
Involuntary Intoxication: A Potential Defence
In contrast to voluntary intoxication, involuntary intoxication may provide a defence. Involuntary intoxication occurs when a person is intoxicated without their knowledge or consent, for example, if their drink is spiked. R v Allen [1988] Crim LR 698 clarifies that if a person has consumed alcohol voluntarily, then its effects, no matter how unexpected, will not be considered involuntary. In R v Kingston [1994] 3 WLR 519, the defendant, who had pedophilic tendencies, was drugged which resulted in him assaulting an underage boy. Even though the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated, the mens rea for the offence was deemed present, leading to a conviction. Thus, even with involuntary intoxication, the presence of the requisite intent will be considered, and a defence will not necessarily succeed. The distinction is between a defendant who takes a drug voluntarily and one who is intoxicated without any knowledge, awareness, or intention. The focus remains on whether the defendant possessed the necessary intent, regardless of the mode of intoxication.
Intoxication and Automatism
Automatism, a state where a person's actions are not controlled by their conscious mind, can be raised as a defence. However, self-induced automatism caused by alcohol or dangerous drugs does not provide a defence because it is considered reckless. In R v Bailey [1983] 1 W.L.R. 760, a diabetic defendant's actions while in a state of hypoglycaemia were not deemed to be automatism, as his failure to eat after an insulin injection was not considered reckless unless he was aware of the risk of aggressive behaviour arising from the situation. However, self-induced automatism caused by drugs not known to cause aggressive behaviour, such as sedatives, may offer a defence to crimes of basic intent, as shown in R v Hardie [1985] 1 W.L.R. 64. Here, the defendant who took a large dose of Valium was able to argue that he did not appreciate the risks of his actions, and that his actions were not necessarily reckless. The distinction between dangerous and non-dangerous drugs and whether the defendant was aware of the risks are crucial factors in determining the validity of an automatism defence in cases involving intoxication.
Intoxication and Other Defences
Intoxication can also interact with other criminal defences. With self-defence, if the belief in the need for self-defence arises from a drunken mistake, this mistake cannot form the basis of a defence according to R v O’Grady [1987] 3 WLR 321 and R v O’Connor [1991] Crim LR 135. Although a person may be judged on the facts as they believed them to be, this does not extend to self-induced intoxicated mistakes. In relation to duress, the effect of self-intoxication on lowering the will to resist a threat will not be considered when evaluating the defence as clarified in R v Graham [1982] 1 W.L.R. 294. Similarly, loss of control, a partial defence to murder, cannot be supported by voluntary intoxication, R v Asmelash [2013] 1 Cr App R 33 states. The case highlights how the test for loss of control will be approached without taking into account the defendant's voluntary intoxication. This shows that the law seeks to hold individuals accountable for their actions whilst intoxicated and will not allow intoxication to undermine other defences. With diminished responsibility, as confirmed in R v Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim 281, voluntary intoxication does not fall within the scope of “recognized medical condition” as specified in s2(1) Homicide Act 1957, as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, and so is not a basis for a successful defence. However, chronic alcoholism can form a basis of a defence if the defendant can show an abnormality of mental function from the chronic alcoholism, as stated in R v Stewart [2009] 1 WLR 2507. The test must also consider the effect of the alcohol consumed as a result of the illness, not the alcohol consumed voluntarily. This is further refined in R v Wood [2008] EWCA Crim 1305, which clarifies the factors relevant when considering diminished responsibility and alcoholism.
Statutory Exceptions and Special Cases
Despite the general principles, some statutory exceptions allow intoxication to be a defence. In Jaggard v Dickinson [1981] QB 527, a defendant who honestly believed she had permission to enter a property, due to a drunken mistake, was able to rely on the specific defence within s5(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. This showed that specific statutory defences may be available regardless of a defendant's voluntary intoxication. The Intoxicating Substance (Supply) Act 1985 was introduced to deal with the growing problem of solvent abuse and it was repealed by the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016, which adopts a zero tolerance approach to the supply of psychoactive substances. Cases such as Barrett v Ministry of Defence [1995] 1 WLR 1217 highlight civil law considerations and how even intoxicated individuals will be held liable for their own actions up to a point. Morris v Murray [1991] 2 QB 6 also covers the implications of volenti non fit injuria and the point at which an intoxicated person will still be deemed to have knowingly accepted risks.
Conclusion
The intoxication defence in criminal law is a complex area of law with specific rules that seeks to balance individual responsibility with the effects of substance use. The distinction between specific and basic intent crimes from DPP v Majewski, forms the basis of the analysis. The general rule, as seen in R v Caldwell, is that voluntary intoxication is not a defence for crimes of basic intent. However, cases such as R v Hardie show that there are potential exceptions to these rules. R v Kingston highlights the complications around involuntary intoxication. Furthermore, the interrelationship between intoxication and other defences, as covered by cases such as R v Graham and R v Dowds, highlights how difficult it is to rely upon intoxication as a defence. Despite general principles that seek to limit its scope, statutory exceptions, as demonstrated in Jaggard v Dickinson, exist. Overall, the law is clear in holding individuals accountable for their actions, particularly where substance use is voluntary, while making some allowances for involuntary intoxication in appropriate circumstances.
