Introduction
Oblique intention, in the context of criminal law, describes a mental state where an individual does not directly aim to achieve a specific outcome, but foresees that outcome as a virtually certain consequence of their actions. This contrasts with direct intention, where the desired outcome is the actor's primary aim. The technical principle at play is not the desire for a particular result, but rather the awareness of its inevitable occurrence. Key requirements for establishing oblique intention revolve around demonstrating that the accused understood the virtual certainty of the consequence stemming from their deliberate acts. The assessment of oblique intention relies on established legal precedents to determine if an individual should be held liable for the foreseen consequences of their actions, even if they were not the ultimate objective.
Understanding the Nuances of Oblique Intention
The concept of oblique intention occupies a critical space in the legal evaluation of criminal culpability. It represents a situation in which the perpetrator does not directly intend a particular consequence but acknowledges its virtual certainty as a result of their actions. This is distinct from a direct or purposive intention where the individual actively seeks a specific outcome. The legal significance lies in determining the extent to which foresight of inevitable consequences should equate with intentionality in criminal law. For instance, an individual might set a fire to a building with the aim of causing damage, whilst knowing that the occupants will be injured or even die, a consequence that they do not actively wish. The law must, therefore, ascertain whether the individual's foresight is sufficient to justify holding them criminally responsible for those injuries or deaths. This is not a question of what the individual wished, but rather what they recognized as a certainty.
The Evolution of Oblique Intention Through Key Cases
Several landmark cases illustrate the challenges and changes in judicial treatment of oblique intention. Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55 provides an early example, where the court initially suggested that foresight of a highly probable outcome was sufficient to establish the necessary intention for murder. This decision generated significant confusion within legal circles. The judicial approach was subsequently refined in R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82, wherein the House of Lords held that the appropriate test for establishing intention, where death or serious harm is not the desired objective, requires foresight of virtual certainty. This meant that there had to be a clear recognition of the inevitable consequence of the act and a "substantial risk" was not enough. This standard, set in Woollin, was an acknowledgement that the test for intention should be distinct from recklessness and the line between the two should not be blurred. The Woollin judgment provided clarity, that intention is not the mere probability of a consequence arising from one's actions, but a virtually certain result that the defendant foresees. This refinement was critical, as it reduced the risk of convicting individuals of murder simply for having acted recklessly.
Oblique Intention and the Rule of Evidence: R v Matthews and Alleyne
The judgment in R v Matthews and Alleyne [2003] EWCA Crim 192 further clarifies the role of foresight of virtual certainty in establishing intention. This case affirmed that the Woollin test operates as a rule of evidence rather than a substantive rule of law. In other words, while a jury is entitled to infer intention from the defendant's appreciation that a certain consequence was virtually certain, they are not obliged to do so. The facts of Matthews and Alleyne involved the defendants throwing a victim into a river, knowing that he was unable to swim. The Court of Appeal determined that, despite a misdirection by the judge who had treated the Woollin test as a substantive rule, the conviction was nonetheless safe. Rix LJ explained that the jury is ‘entitled to find intention for murder’ based on their appreciation that death was ‘virtually certain’, not that they ‘must find intention’. This highlights the jury's discretionary power in such cases and stresses the evidential nature of the virtual certainty test. The court clarified that the Woollin guidelines provide the basis for inference, not the definition itself.
Distinguishing Direct Intention and Oblique Intention
The conceptual separation between direct and oblique intention is critical in criminal law. Direct intention exists when the actor's aim is to achieve a specific result. For example, a person who shoots another person with the aim of ending their life acts with direct intention. Oblique intention, on the other hand, arises when the actor foresees a consequence of their act as a virtual certainty, without that result necessarily forming part of their primary objective. R v Steane [1947] KB 997, (1948) 32 Cr. App. R. 61, illustrates this principle, wherein the court overturned a conviction when it was clear the defendant was coerced into assisting the enemy and did not have a direct intention to do so. The facts of the case involved an actor forced to make broadcasts for Germany during World War II. While the court acknowledged that the actor knew the natural consequences of his actions, it held that there was no intention to assist the enemy. This case confirms that an individual's purpose should not be conflated with the foreseen consequence of their actions.
The distinction becomes particularly important in cases of complex actions, where multiple outcomes can result from a single act. When assessing intention, it is important to not confuse the motive of an action with the legal principle of intention. The legal determination should rely on the presence of either a primary goal, in the case of direct intention, or the recognition of a virtually certain outcome, in the case of oblique intention. Re A (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961, provides a useful example. The case involved the separation of conjoined twins. The surgery would inevitably result in the death of one twin, but was necessary to save the life of the other. The court accepted that although death was a virtually certain outcome, it was not the intention, rather the purpose was to save the other twin.
The Role of Purpose in Defining Intention
The definition of intention is often framed in terms of purpose, particularly when distinguishing between direct and oblique intention. R v Heard [2007] EWCA Crim. 125 clarifies the concept of specific intent as an ulterior purpose that extends beyond the act itself. In Heard, the defendant was under self-induced drunkenness when he rubbed his penis against a police officer’s leg and he was convicted with sexual assault. Hughes LJ's judgment in Heard contrasts specific intent with basic intent, arguing that crimes of specific intent require proof of a purpose beyond the immediate actus reus. However, many precedent cases, notably concerning murder, indicate that crimes of specific intent do not necessarily require a purpose beyond the immediate act. For instance, murder does not require an ulterior intent but only an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, and in those instances, oblique intent can be sufficient for a conviction.
This highlights a critical point that, despite using ‘ulterior intent’ as an example of specific intent, this is not the only circumstance, or that having an ulterior intent is a requirement for specific intent. There can be cases in specific intent, notably murder, where there is no ulterior intent but there is direct or oblique intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm. A further issue regarding Heard's commentary is that oblique intention is not considered as ‘purposive’ intent. This illustrates that the terminology used is often not a perfect fit. These subtle distinctions emphasize the complexity of intent in law and how the definition is highly dependent on context.
Oblique Intention in Civil Law: Contrasting Contexts
While oblique intention is primarily discussed in criminal law, similar concepts of intended consequences exist in civil law, particularly when considering equitable doctrines. Crossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2012] 2 All ER 754, provides a unique instance in civil law where there was a discussion as to whether Pallant v Morgan equity was based on a breach of fiduciary duty or a common intention constructive trust (CICT). This case shows a direct parallel to the difficulties surrounding intent in criminal law. Just as the courts analyze the state of mind of a criminal defendant, in Crossco there was a dispute as to whether the actions of a party constituted a breach of duty. The contrasting judgments within Crossco highlight a wider problem, that intention can be interpreted in different ways. In criminal law, these interpretations could determine whether a defendant is guilty or innocent, and in civil law, these different analyses can affect the allocation of property rights. This demonstrates how the concept of intention, even outside of a criminal context, is not always straight forward.
Conclusion
The concept of oblique intention plays a fundamental role in determining criminal liability. It requires a clear understanding of how foresight of a virtually certain consequence relates to the legal concept of intention, especially in comparison to direct intention. Through cases like Hyam, Woollin, Matthews and Alleyne, and Steane, the legal system has incrementally clarified that while awareness of a virtually certain outcome is strong evidence of intention, it is not an absolute definition of it. The concept of ‘specific intent,’ outlined in Heard shows that intent is complex and that there are nuances to the definition based on specific contexts. Furthermore, the contrasting arguments in Crossco demonstrate that the issue of intention and mental states is not limited to criminal law. Ultimately, establishing oblique intention requires a careful and detailed examination of the defendant’s mental state, considering the facts, their aim, and the inherent probabilities of their actions.
