Facts
- The defendant, Campbell, was observed loitering outside a small suburban post office.
- When police officers approached and detained him they found:
- A loaded-looking imitation firearm concealed beneath his jacket.
- A handwritten note addressed to the cashier that read, in effect, “This is a robbery—hand over the money.”
- Campbell admitted in interview that he intended to rob the post office once the premises became less busy, but he had not yet stepped across the threshold, threatened a member of staff, or produced either the weapon or the note to any person.
- He was nevertheless charged under section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 with attempted robbery.
Issues
- Did Campbell’s conduct pass the legal line separating “mere preparation” from the actus reus of an attempt?
- Can possession in public of both an imitation firearm and a note of demand, together with an admitted intention to rob, satisfy the proximity requirement of an attempted robbery?
Decision
- The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.
- The judges accepted that Campbell had the requisite mens rea—he intended to commit robbery.
- However, the acts relied upon by the prosecution remained preliminary. Campbell had not entered the building, confronted staff, produced the gun, or issued the threatening note.
- On those facts the court ruled that the defendant had not “embarked upon the crime proper” but was still at a preparatory stage.
- Accordingly the statutory requirement that the defendant do an act “more than merely preparatory” to the commission of the offence (Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(1)) was not met.
Legal Principles
- Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 requires proof that the accused does an act that is “more than merely preparatory” to the full offence. The phrase establishes a functional test of proximity rather than a rigid formula.
- Earlier authorities such as Boyle and Boyle (1987) and more contemporary cases like Gullefer (1990) indicate that the court must ask whether the defendant has done something that can only sensibly be regarded as part of the execution of the full crime.
- By contrast, acts that can still be readily abandoned without confronting the victim are ordinarily preparatory.
- R v Campbell confirms that standing outside a target premises, even while armed and possessed of a demand note, does not cross the line in a robbery context. There must be a step that places the victim in immediate jeopardy or begins the execution phase, for example entry with the weapon or direct communication of the threat.
- The case therefore refines the boundary between preparation and attempt, showing that proximity is assessed not merely by physical closeness but by whether the defendant has started the actual offence sequence.
Application to the Facts
- Campbell’s possession of disguise, weapon, and note demonstrated a settled plan, yet these items remained concealed.
- His conduct lacked confrontation, compulsion, or any movement inside the building—the elements that would place employees or customers in immediate fear.
- The ability to retreat before any confrontation meant the offence had not begun. The “point of no return,” often cited in attempt cases, had not been reached.
Comparative Authority
- Gullefer (throwing himself onto a racetrack to void a bet) was held preparatory because he still had to reclaim the stake. Likewise, Geddes (found in a school toilet with binding materials) was preparatory because no child had been confronted. Campbell fits within the same reasoning pattern: equipment plus intent is inadequate without an act directly interacting with the victim or property.
Conclusion
R v Campbell reaffirms that attempted robbery demands not only intent but also an act that immediately precedes the completed offence. Because Campbell paused outside the post office and had not yet exposed the staff to threat or violence, the Court of Appeal concluded that his behaviour remained preparatory. The conviction for attempted robbery was therefore quashed, emphasizing that liability for attempt arises only when the defendant’s conduct has progressed beyond planning to the execution phase of the intended crime.
