Introduction
Consent, a key part of criminal law for sexual offences, requires real agreement by the complainant to the act. The Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Tabassum [2000] 2 Cr App R 328 set out a clear rule for when consent is invalid due to lies about the act’s purpose. The court found consent could be invalid if deception concerns the type or aim of the act, even if the complainant knew the physical actions involved. The case shows the need for truth and real agreement in deciding valid consent. This rule helps protect individual choice and makes sure consent is not obtained through lies.
The Facts of R v Tabassum
The appellant, Tabassum, falsely claimed to be running a breast cancer study. He convinced three women to let him examine their breasts by saying it was for medical research. None of the women would have agreed if they knew his real motive, which the court found was sexual gratification.
The Legal Issue: Deception About Purpose
The main question for the Court of Appeal was whether the women’s consent to the touching was legally valid. While they knew the physical act involved—a breast exam—they were misled about its true aim. The prosecution argued this deception meant there was no valid consent.
The Court of Appeal’s Decision
The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, ruling the women’s consent was invalid because they were deceived about the exam’s purpose. The court separated consent to the physical act from consent to its actual aim. The women agreed to the touching believing it was for medical reasons, not the appellant’s sexual goal. This deception made their consent legally invalid.
The Importance of R v Tabassum
R v Tabassum clarified how courts handle deception and consent. It established that lies about the core aim of an act—even if the physical actions are understood—can make consent invalid. This rule protects against misuse and ensures consent depends on truthful communication. The decision has been used in later cases and remains important in how courts interpret consent in sexual offences.
Comparing R v Tabassum with R v Richardson
The Court of Appeal compared Tabassum with R v Richardson [1998] 2 Cr App R 200. In Richardson, a dentist kept treating patients after being suspended. The court ruled the patients consented to the act’s type and aim (dental treatment), despite the lie about her qualifications. The difference lies in what was lied about: Richardson involved a lie about professional status, not the act’s core aim, while Tabassum concerned deception about the act’s true intent.
Applying R v Tabassum: Examples
Example 1: A man lies about being a massage therapist offering free sessions. A woman agrees, thinking it is a professional service, but the man’s real aim is sexual gratification. Following Tabassum, her consent would be invalid due to deception about the act’s purpose.
Example 2: A person pretends to be a doctor doing a medical exam. If the real aim is sexual assault, the patient’s consent is invalid because the exam’s stated purpose was false.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Tabassum marked a key step in consent law for sexual offences. It confirmed that lies about an act’s core aim—even with knowledge of its physical aspects—invalidate consent. This rule helps prevent harm by requiring honesty for lawful contact. The contrast with Richardson further shows how courts decide whether deception relates to the act’s central aim. This approach continues to guide legal practice in sexual offence cases. Later decisions like R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699 and R v Devonald [2008] EWCA Crim 527 have followed these ideas, showing Tabassum’s ongoing impact on consent law.
